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## **Motivational Dialogue in the Second Language Setting**

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### **Abstract**

This study argues for the relevance of a model of social interaction referred to as “motivational dialogue” as proposed by Patyayeva (2012) grounded in the concept of dialogue as proposed by L. S. Vygotsky and M. Bakhtin. The model accounts for two types of motivational dialogue: that which unfolds in social environments between two or more individuals and that which unfolds internally as private or inner speech. In the extension of Patyayeva’s model to L2 teaching and learning situations, as proposed in the present study, two critical concepts of Vygotsky’s theory are also brought into consideration: *perezhivanie* (the dialectical interaction between emotion and intellect) and the social situation of development (how a particular context is refracted through the personality of an individual who participates in that context. Two examples from the published literature (Matusov 2011) and Lantolf and Genung (2002) are used to illustrate how motivational dialogue might operate in educational settings. The study concludes with several recommendations for how future research might be carried out in L2 settings.

### **Keywords**

Motivational model, *perezhivanie*, social situation of development, dialogue, dialectics

## **1 Introduction**

The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications for second language learning and teaching of the model of motivational dialogue proposed by Patayeva (2012). As Ellis (2008, p. 677) reminds us, “no single individual difference factor in language learning has received as much attention as MOTIVATION.” Indeed, from the publication of Gardner and Lambert’s (1959) early study on motivation to the recently edited volume by Al-Hoorie and MacIntyre (2019) a superabundance of research has focused on various aspects of motivation and its role in L2 acquisition, including the concept of the ‘ideal L2 self’ proposed by Csizer and Dörnyei (2005). Until Patayeva’s model, to my knowledge, most of the L2 motivation research has focused on individuals, on the assumption that individual learner differences, including motivation, consist of “enduring personal characteristics that are assumed to apply to everybody and on which people differ by degree” (Dörnyei, 2005, p. 4). Patayeva’s (2012) model, however, as will be explained later, represents a different approach to motivation, as it assigns a significant role to the inter- and intra-individual dialogue. As we will see, Patayeva’s model is based on the role that dialogue plays both in Bakhtin’s and Vygotsky’s respective theories of learning and development.

To begin to make the case for the relevance of motivational dialogue, I will consider previously published data from the work of Matusov (2011) and Lantolf and Genung (2002). While neither study specifically focused on motivational dialogue, I nevertheless, believe that the data from the respective studies illustrates to some extent at least how the model might play out in classroom settings. Matusov's study addresses what is traditionally called language arts rather than second language learning, but it does have the advantage of presenting actual excerpts of the dialogue that transpired between students and a teacher. Lantolf and Genung's study requires a bit of speculation on my part with regard to how both inter- and intra-individual dialogue might have unfolded as a student grappled with what for her was an intolerable learning environment. Lantolf and Genung's original study is informed by sociocultural and activity theory (SCT), while Matusov's is framed within Bakhtin's approach to education and the special importance he assigned to dialogue. My hope is that SCT researchers will find the model sufficiently attractive to undertake empirical studies specifically designed to investigate the full implications of motivational dialogue for L2 learning and education.

## 2 Preliminaries

Before presenting Patyayeva's models it will be helpful to consider two relevant concepts of Vygotsky's theory. These are the social situation of development and *perezhivanie*. An in-depth discussion of the array of complexities affiliated with each concept is not feasible here. I will instead outline the essential features of each concept and will then show how each contributes to our understanding of the processes at work in motivational dialogue.

### 2.1 Social situation of development

Vygotsky (1994) proposed what he called the "social situation of development" (SSD) capture that dialectical nature of the interaction that occurs between individuals and their social surround that of course includes other individuals and which functions as the source of higher forms of mental functioning. The key, according to Vygotsky, is not to be found in the social factors themselves, but in how these factors are "refracted" as light through a prism rather than reflected as light off a mirror (p. 340). The point is to uncover the particular relationship that holds between an individual and her or his social environment; that is, how the individual interprets the events and objects in the environment at a particular moment in time, keeping in mind that the individual also contributes to the formation of that environment. It is therefore possible for the same individual to interpret and therefore react to what seems to be same the situation at different points in time in very different ways. This is because in all probability the individual at time one and at time two is not the same individual because he or she has changed over time. It is also likely that two different individuals will interpret and react to what objectively appears to be the same environment in very different ways, because they are indeed different individuals. Thus, Vygotsky distinguishes between an objective social situation, which would be open to inspection to a third party and a subjective social situation, which is how that objective circumstance is refracted through the psychological system of the individual(s). This he called the social situation of development. An essential feature of the refractive process is played by the concept of *perezhivanie*, which he introduced in his later writings.

### 2.2 *Perezhivanie*

*Perezhivanie* has become a topic of debate and discussion among those working to understand the complexities of Vygotsky's general theory. In Vygotsky's thinking, the reaction of an individual to a particular SSD always entails an emotional component (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 341). The term Vygotsky used to describe how an individual emotionally relates to an event or object is *perezhivanie*, which does

not have an appropriate English equivalent, and is inadequately translated as ‘lived experience’. In his early writings on the psychology of art, Vygotsky (1971) used *perezhivanie*, more or less in its ordinary Russian interpretation to indicate how someone emotionally reacts to a work of art as an aesthetic experience (Veresov, 2017, p. 48). In his later work, however, he reshaped it as a concept that was intended to play a central role in his theory of the formation and function of higher mental processes.

To appreciate the significance of *perezhivanie* for Vygotsky’s later work, we need to remember that a fundamental aspect of his methodology, influenced by Marx’s research methodology, was the search for appropriate units through which consciousness as a functional system comprised of various elements, including perception, attention, memory, creativity, imagination, emotion, language could be properly studied. Analyzing the units would allow the researcher to gain at least partial access to the system, which in its entirety, was too large and complex to study as a whole. Among the original and highly productive units that Vygotsky (1987) proposed was thinking and speaking as represented in word meaning. Eventually, however, Vygotsky came to realize the importance of emotion in the development and functioning of human consciousness, especially as a way of understanding the role and influence of the environment (SSD) in development.

According to Veresov (2017, p. 58) *perezhivanie* reveals what and how an individual experiences emotionally a concrete social situation and thus makes it into the SSD. However, *perezhivanie* is not just about emotion, which in itself is not a unit. It also entails other components of consciousness, as Vygotsky put it “In the process of social life, feelings develop and former connections disintegrate; emotions appear in new relations with other elements of mental life, new systems develop, new alloys of mental functions and unities of higher order appear within which special patterns, interdependencies, special forms of connection and movement are dominant” (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 244). Among the other elements of mental life are the intellect or thinking. Thus, the new unit of analysis of consciousness, *perezhivanie*, is comprised of the dialectical unity of emotion and intellect. Yaroshevsky (1999, p. 266) described Vygotsky’s thinking on this point as follows: “for Vygotsky, it was not units of verbal thinking in themselves (signs as carriers of meaning), but their affective charge that became the main subject of contemplation of the specifics of psychological analysis in contrast to linguosemiotic analysis.”

*Perezhivanie*, as a theoretical concept, is inseparably linked to the SSD, in the sense that “the environment determines [perhaps “shapes” is more appropriate, given that determines is perhaps too strong a notion] the development of the individual through the individual’s *perezhivanie* of the environment” (Veresov, 2020, p. 188). The key to understanding the connection between *perezhivanie* and SSD is the concept of ‘refraction’, the term Vygotsky (1994) used instead of reflection to capture the person environment relationship. Refraction implies that no feature of the environment in itself can shape development; rather, only those features that are refracted through the individual’s *perezhivanie* can do so (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 341). This is because, as Veresov (2020, p. 188) stresses, the “individual is always a part of the social situation and the relation of the individual to the environment and the environment to the individual occurs through the *perezhivanie* of the individual.” Only those aspects of the environment that emotionally impact and intellectually challenge the individual in the process of developing (i.e., becoming what they not yet are) are refracted through the mental prism of that individual. In short, through the process of refraction the social situation becomes the SSD (Veresov, 200, p. 188). The conflict that arises between the individual and the social environment, as refracted through *perezhivanie*, is often described by Vygotsky as the drama of development (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 71): “the dynamic of the personality is drama”. He goes so far as to propose that “psychology must be developed in the concepts of drama, not in the concepts of processes.”

### 3 Bakhtin and Vygotsky on Dialogue

In comparing Bakhtin and Vygotsky with regard to the relevance of dialogue in their respective theories,

it is important to keep in mind that Bakhtin was a philosopher and literary scholar, while Vygotsky was a psychologist. Both had an interest in the role of language (understood more as a verb than a noun) in the human condition. To be sure, Vygotsky had a deep interest in, and drew inspiration from, philosophy as he undertook to build a new general theory of human consciousness, the phenomenon that he argued made humans unique from all other life forms. For his part, Bakhtin seemed to be less interested in how consciousness develops, phylogenetically, socioculturally, and ontogenetically than he was in how consciousness is voiced through dialogue. Bakhtin's adopts a phenomenological orientation, which is more concerned with describing lived experience and lived knowledge, instead of a more scientific stance, which Vygotsky adopted to explain the origin and functioning of higher mental processing. On the other hand, both scholars were interested in the role that others play in the formation of the self and one's identity and both had a keen interest in education, including language learning (see Bakhtin, 2004; Vygotsky, 1987).

According to Sullivan (2010), both Vygotsky and Bakhtin provide insight into different and complementary dimensions of consciousness. Through Vygotsky's dialectical orientation, consciousness "becomes ever more sophisticated in its progress along a developmental, horizontal continuum" (p. 371). Although Bakhtin entertained dialectics in his early thinking, he eventually rejected it rather forcefully, arguing that it allows no space for multivoicedness, individuality, emotion, judgment and creativity (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 147). Through Bakhtin's purely dialogical orientation, "we can glimpse the person experiencing this progression amidst a more vertical axiology of values—from authoritative to carnivalistic knowing." (Sullivan, 2010, p. 371). For Bakhtin, dialogue is an "everyday symbolic experience" that involves "interaction, context, and linguistic communicative construction". It is never final and does not entail predetermined outcomes (White, 2014, p. 223).

Patyayeva (2012) points out that Bakhtin connects all dialogue to three concepts having to do with self-determination. The first is that individuals are never "finalized, completely understood, known or fully characterized" by any psychological label, such as trait, type, complex, etc. (p. 200). This means that humans change their behaviors in radical and unpredictable ways such that every individual is "unfinished and capable of essential changes and transformations" (p. 200). For Bakhtin, the utterances that form a dialogue, whether social or psychological (see the following paragraph for details), are imbued with ideology, most especially imparted by those with authoritative standing, such as parents, teachers, work supervisors, political figures, etc. Thus, dialogues, including those carried out privately in one's consciousness, are a confrontation and struggle between authoritative and carnivalistic knowing (Sullivan, 2010, p. 368). By carnivalistic Bakhtin means utterances that challenge and even subvert "taken-for-granted assumptions" (Sullivan, 2010, p. 362). To be sure, Bakhtin's framework does not uniformly reject the voice of authoritative knowledge, as happens in school, a site where students would surely benefit "from merging with the more competent" teachers (Eun, 2016, p. 120).

Vygotsky, on the other hand, because of his commitment to Marxian dialectics, a perspective that Bakhtin early on entertained, but eventually rejected (Bakhtin, 1986) as a methodology for understanding human experience. For Bakhtin, dialectics does not pay sufficient attention to such aspects of communication as "voice, intonation, living words, and responses and the diversity of consciousness in the immediacy of interaction" (Sullivan, 2010, p. 366). For Vygotsky, dialectics is the key to understanding how the appropriation and internalization of cultural tools and artifacts linked to practical activity give rise to the formation of higher forms of psychological functioning.

Vygotsky's commitment as a dialectical thinker does not mean that there is no place for dialogue in his theory. Those who reject the relevance of dialogue for Vygotsky seem not to have delved deeply enough into his writings. For instance, Wegerif (2007) bases his anti-dialogic case primarily on a book chapter by Wertsch and Kazak (2011) [apparently Wegerif had access to a pre-published (2005) version of the chapter] in which these authors suggest that cultural tools rather than dialogue are foregrounded by Vygotsky as the key component in the development of higher mental functions. This is a restricted perspective of Vygotsky's orientation, as is evidenced in the following excerpts from Vygotsky's writings:

*Thus we might say that through others we become ourselves, and this rule applies not only to the individual as a whole but also to the history of each separate function.*

*... Every higher mental function was external because it was social before it became an internal, strictly mental function; it was formerly a social relation of two people. The means of acting on oneself is initially a means of acting on others or a means of action of others on the individual.*

*... All basic forms of social intercourse between the adult and the child later become mental functions.* (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 105)

*the mentality of the infant from the first moment of his life is locked into common life with other people. The child initially reacts not to separate feelings but to people around him.* (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 235)

*the child is not so much in contact with a world of lifeless external stimuli as across and through it to a much more internal although primitive communication with the personalities that surround him.* (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 236)

Wegerif (2007, p. 33) worries about Vygotsky's inability to "provide an adequate account of how children learn to think creatively," which, for Wegerif, emanates from "the dialogical relation, rather than in the use of pre-existing cultural tools." However, in his discussions on the development of imagination in childhood, Vygotsky (1987, p. 346) writes the following: "The development of imagination is linked to the development of speech, to the development of the child's social interaction with those around him, to the basic forms of collective social activity of the child's consciousness." This clearly demonstrates an understanding of the relevance of dialogue in the development of human consciousness.

In more than one portion of his work, Vygotsky recognizes the significance of intonation, emotion, gesture, context, etc., that figure crucially in dialogic interaction. Wegerif (2007, p. 38) indeed mentions the example Vygotsky (1987, p. 271) offers from a work by Dostoevsky to demonstrate how intonation alone can be deployed to create meaning in concrete contexts. The example involves several drunken sailors who create an array of meanings by simply shifting their intonation when producing a string of one-word utterances comprised of an "unprintable" Russian expletive. Following the excerpt Vygotsky writes:

*Dostoevskii writes that it is possible to express all thoughts, all sensations—even a whole chain of argument—through a single word. Here, this becomes possible when we use intonation to transfer the internal psychological context, that is, the context within which the word's sense can be understood.* (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 271)

It seems clear that for both Bakhtin and Vygotsky dialogue is our life mode both socially as well as psychologically (see Harré, 2004 for a similar view on the dialogic nature of life). It means that once we have participated in social communication, we are never again isolated and alone because we live in a "net of relationships" through which "everyone is influenced by others" to the extent that how we think, act, perceive our self is inescapably intertwined with how others think, act, and perceive us (Patyayeva, 2012, p. 200). The "continuous dialogue" through which we live our lives is a source of freedom and unpredictability because dialogue offers new understandings, ideas, concepts and emotional experiences that are candidates for internalization and restructuring of the higher functional system (Patyayeva, 2012, p. 200). This is an orientation that resonates closely with Vygotsky's (1997, p. 105) proposal that our consciousness is always quasisocial.

There can be little doubt that Vygotsky was sensitive to the relevance of dialogue for the formation and function of human consciousness. Dialogue is important in Vygotsky's thinking on the formation

and functioning of human consciousness. I do not see ambivalence in Vygotsky's thinking on dialogue and dialectics. I believe the case can be made that he is both a dialectic and a dialogic thinker (see Dafermos, 2021).

Interpersonal "I ~ You" dialogues are internalized and transformed into intrapersonal psychological "I ~ Me" private/inner speech dialogues (Vocate, 1994). In social dialogues the I is simultaneously an I, that expresses a belief, opinion, observation, suggestion, emotion, etc. and a You that receives a critical, accepting, ambivalent, etc. response from an interlocutor. Once we internalize the experience of participating in social dialogues, we transform these experiences into psychological dialogues (i.e., private speech) in which the "I" expresses an opinion or an emotion, offers an explanation, proposes a plan of action, and the "Me", as You in social dialogue, accepts, rejects, modifies, regulates, etc. what "I" has expressed. In private dialogue, similar to highly contextualized social dialogue, much is left unsaid as the context itself does a good deal of the semantic work that need not be verbalized. Thus, private dialogues tend to be abbreviated, difficult for others to interpret and most often take place at a subvocal level, a topic I return to in the conclusion. Dialogues are polyphonic (Patyayeva, 2012, p. 200), which means that each individual voice is comprised of multiple voices carrying different meanings, viewpoints, ideologies, beliefs, and knowledge that we interact with and transform into our own voice (see Wertsch 1991). Patyayeva makes a legitimate case for using Bakhtin and Vygotsky to construct her models of motivational dialogue, the topic I turn to next.

## **4 Models of Motivational Dialogue**

Patyayeva proposes two interrelated models of motivational dialogue. The first is overtly social or interpersonal. As such it entails overt social interaction between or among two or more individuals. Although Patyayeva does not use the term social in conjunction with the first model, for convenience, I refer to as a socially motivated dialogue and abbreviate it as SMOD. The second, self-determined motivational model, is psychological or intrapersonal. It is a derivative of the first (to be explained below). For convenience I abbreviate this model as SDMOD.

### **4.1 SMOD**

According to Patyayeva, instead of obeying or disobeying a motivating influence, SMOD offers a third way of dealing with that influence. (Rather than reference each paraphrase or quote from Patyayeva's 2012 text, I will state here that the six stages are described on page 201 of her text.) The initial stage of the process is the motivating influence itself, which can be manifested in a variety of ways, including command, request, proposal, goal setting, hinting, storytelling, throwing out an idea for consideration, as well as norms, customs and prescriptions. In the second stage the addressee becomes the speaker, who does not obey or disobey the initiator of the process, but instead through a response, may question, challenge, quarrel with, contest, or offer an alternative way of behaving. Thus a speaker's response converts the interlocutors into opponents and generates a degree of tension between them. In the third stage the interlocutors search for a way to resolve the opposition and relieve the tension that arose in stage two. The fourth stage consists of arguments, quarrels, and at times, use of harsh language, discussions, and compromises. In the fifth stage, a solution is formed and accepted as some of the ideas and proposals offered in previous stages are foregrounded while others are backgrounded. The decision at this stage may be mutually agreed upon or it may be imposed by one of the interlocutors, which can result in "the rupture of relationships." In the sixth and final stage the decided action is executed.

Patyayeva (p. 202) captures the six-stage process in a flowchart model, which for ease of presentation, I have taken the liberty of recasting as Table 1, while preserving the essential features of the model.

Table 1

*Stages of SMOD (based on Patyayeva 2012, p. 202)*

Stage	Description
1. Induce	Request, order, suggest other person do something
2. Oppose	Interlocutor questions, doubts argues proposes alternative to (1)
3. Search	Jointly produce new ideas to overcome conflict in (2)
4. Discuss	Jointly consider ideas in (3) to reach agreement
5. Decide	Jointly reach a decision derived from (4)
6. Execute	Jointly carry out the decision reached in (5)

Following is an invented and simple interpersonal SMOD between a parent and a child. At issue is the time at which the child is to go to bed (numbers correspond to the stages described in Table 1 above):

- P: It's 9:00pm, time for you to go to bed because you have to get up early to catch the school bus. (1)
- C: I know, but I'm not tired (2), can't I stay up another half hour and then I'll go to bed (3)
- P: You said that yesterday, but then stayed up another two hours until 11:00pm and you almost missed the bus because you didn't wake up in time. (4)
- C: I know I did, but tonight I promise to go to bed at 9:30 (4)
- P: OK. But only one half hour more. Not two! (5)
- C: Thanks. (6)

The preceding exchange captures the basic features of a jointly determined motivational process because both participants contribute to the problem and its resolution. Not all interpersonal dialogues are as simple and straightforward, and of course they do not always result in mutual agreements on a resolution to a conflict, as I will show in the SMOD of an L2 learner. In many cases the initiator, if he or she has appropriate power, imposes her or his will on the recipient, while in other cases, even if the initiator has power, the recipient may resist and be willing to suffer the consequences should there be any.

## 4.2 SDMOD

Before presenting Payayeva's model of SDMOD, it will be beneficial to consider briefly Vygotsky's approach to the notion of self-control, as it relates to free will, voluntary acts, and intentionality, all of which are relevant for the model.

### 4.2.1 Self-control

According to Aidman and Leontiev (1991, p. 141), Vygotsky conceptualized free will as a higher psychological function in which an individual exercises voluntary control over an action (physical or mental) when the individual "is not provided with adequate incentives." A key component of this function is mediation through self-generated symbolic stimuli. Keep in mind, of course, that self-mediation is derived from those forms of mediation that an individual experience when interacting socially with others. Recall that for Vygotsky, higher mental functions are always quasisocial.

To flesh things out, I will begin by summarizing, with some liberties, Vygotsky's (1997) discussion of Buridan's donkey. The donkey found itself in a quandary as it suffered from both thirst and hunger. Should it take a drink or eat from a pile of hay? It was unable to resolve the quandary and therefore did

neither and perished. Vygotsky asks what would a human do in such a situation? His answer is that a human would create an auxiliary means to decide whether to eat or drink—flip a coin and if heads comes up, drink and if tails comes up, eat. According to Vygotsky, the first part of the process for the human is recognition of the need to make a choice (i.e., to think), which he suggests is free will. The second part of the process is how to make that choice. In the example, the human creates an indirect (i.e., mediated) way of making the choice by using a coin and assigning specific meanings to each of its sides. Once this is done, the decision becomes automatic. Similarly, a person deciding on whether to get out of, or remain in, bed in the morning is confronted with conflicting motives (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 209). To resolve the situation a clock (a cultural artifact) might be pressed into service, whereby the individual assigns meaning to the next five-minute time span and once it expires, gets out of bed. The time-span in itself has no meaning as it is merely five revolutions of the second hand. However, in the specific situation, the revolutions take on meaning because of a human decision to use the clock as a mediational tool.

Vygotsky (1997, p. 211) characterizes the two illustrations as instances of free will, and intention—the “process of controlling one’s own behavior by creating appropriate situations and connections.” However, once the form (flip a coin) and content (heads, drink ~ tails, eat) of mediation are created, carrying out the behavior occurs automatically. Thus, for Vygotsky, free will, paradoxically, creates involuntary acts.

Voluntary control “provides a motivational background for an intended action” as it “creates an incentive to the action” (Aidman & Leontiev, 1991, p. 145), when “external motivation for the needed effort is absent or insufficient” (p. 147). Thus, for Vygotsky, a voluntary act (i.e., free will) entails the decision to act through a specific form of mediation followed by the concrete realization of that act. The intention to act is based on the creation of an action derived from a need, while the motive to act is a reaction to the form of mediation the person creates in order to act (Vygotsky, 1997).

Although the examples of mediation just discussed involve external concrete objects, which Vygotsky used to make his case on free will and self-control clear, once social dialogue (I ~ You) is internalized (I ~ Me), this form of psychological speech empowers individuals to internally control their thinking and behavior, which is a primary function of private or inner speech, as is explained in the next section.

#### *4.2.2 Inner speech*

Atencio and Montero (2009, p. 203) point out that for Vygotsky the dialogue that unfolds in inner speech “continues the social dialogue we experience in our social activities; it constitutes the social formation of mind and therefore, the basis for one’s capacity to plan, direct, and motivate one’s own courses of action.” According to Atencio and Montero (2009, p. 204), mental dialogues, specifically metacognitive private speech (p. 202) are a constant interplay between differing, often conflicting, perspectives as individuals undertake to press into service their experience of their I ~ You dialogues as I ~ Me dialogues (see the discussion of Vocate 1994) in an attempt “to regulate their own motivation based on their appraisals (e.g., self-efficacy beliefs), expectancies (e.g., outcome expectancies), and most importantly, verbal mediation of their awareness and purposeful actions.” It is on the quasisocial nature of internal dialogues that Patyayeva builds her model of SDMOD.

#### *4.2.3 The model*

The six operational stages outlined in Table 1 can be internalized, resulting in a private motivational dialogue in which the I ~ You interaction is now carried out through an I ~ Me conversation. Consequently, individuals are empowered to psychologically mediate themselves as they discuss, critique, argue, propose alternatives, settle on intentions and actions without the intrusion of others. In other words, internal dialogues are the means through which we carry out “the process of real self-



determination” (Atencio & Montero, 2009, p. 203), what Vygotsky (as discussed earlier) refers to as self-control and the exercise of free will. While self-determining dialogue mirrors the six-stage procedure of joint motivational dialogue, it also allows for the possibility of “intermediate variants” depending on the extent to which each stage has been internalized, in which case some of the process may remain external and thus be observable to a third party (p. 204). Patyayeva’s SDMOD is presented in Table 2.

Table 2

*SDMOD (based on Patyayeva, 2012, p. 2004)*

Stage	Description
1. Induce	Order, request (external)      Self-intention, idea
2. Discuss & judge	Order, request, intention, idea
2a. Inner conflict: should I do this or that, should I search for a third way	Contradictory ideas generate conflict
3. Search	Overcome inner conflict: search for new ideas and alternatives to avoid confusion and inaction
4. Discuss	Self-dialogue (I~Me): judge, evaluate, critique to reach decision
5. Decide	Make final decision, set a goal or purpose
6. Execute decision	Overcome opposition posed by alternatives or by others

Patyayeva (p. 205) notes that for individuals to productively engage in SDMODs it is necessary to have opportunities to participate in interpersonal SMODs. If children are denied the opportunity by directive parents, and upon entering school, by controlling teachers, to criticize others’ ideas and to be criticized in a positive way, argue with others, support one’s own preference and evaluate the actions of others, and so on, they will find it difficult to engage in self-determining dialogue that is in any way productive. Even if teachers were less controlling, they are under pressure to cover material prescribed by a curriculum and typically do not have the time to adequately sustain SMODs with their students. While other kinds of dialogue do regularly occur in school (e.g., pedagogical, ideological, truth-oriented), motivational dialogues rarely if ever occur because students are expected to complete tasks and respond to questions, but are not expected to argue, criticize, doubt, etc. what the teacher or the texts may say (Patyayeva, 2012, p. 205).

## 5 Illustrations of Motivational Models

In this section I will consider three examples of motivational dialogues: two that illustrate SMOD and one exemplifying the SDMOD. The first is borrowed from the work of Matusov (2011) and deals with what is typically referred to as language arts. The second and third are drawn from L2 learning and involve the same learner who participates in both types of dialogue. With regard to the language arts SMOD considered in the following section, one could argue, with some confidence, that the interaction that unfolds among the three participants, as I think will become clear, functions simultaneously as a SMOD and as a pedagogical dialogue. Thus, the distinctions Patyayeva makes among different categories might not be as sharply delineated as she proposes. The possibility that a dialogue might integrate multiple interpersonal functions is intriguing and is a topic well worth further exploration.

### 5.1 SMOD and authorial pedagogy

Inspired by the writings of Bakhtin on dialogue and education, Matusov (2011) discusses the distinction

between technological and authorial approaches to education. Matusov (2011, p. 28) characterizes the technological approach as one in which teachers and students aim at “students’ arriving at the curricular endpoints preset by the teacher (and often by the state via curricular standards, tests, and exams).” What is more, student agency is “limited to *willing* [italics in original] participation in unconditional cooperation with the teacher’s assignments”, including homework, note taking, sitting quietly, not talking to classmates during lessons, following the rules set down by the teacher. (p. 28). Any authorship that students engage in during technological education must be “*teacher pleasing*” [italics in original] (p. 29). Students may cooperate or resist a teacher’s demands or may even initiate an activity that falls outside of those demands altogether. The teacher may view student behavior as cooperative or resistant, in which case some kind of punishment might ensue, or the teacher may decide to simply ignore deviations, which can then marginalize the student. In this pedagogy teachers’ voices are authoritative and as such demand “unconditional allegiance” (Wertsch, 1991, p. 78). In terms of Patyayeva’s models, technological pedagogy does not allow for SMOD as a means of overcoming student resistance. In the second example that follows, we will consider an adult learner who challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, an extreme instance of technological pedagogy instantiated in a language classroom.

Authorial pedagogy, on the other hand, “recognizes, values, and actively promotes the *authorial nature* [italics in original] of teaching and learning” ... it “involves the student’s transgression of the preexisting definition of learning in specific curricular areas recognized by the student and other relevant people” (Matusov, 2011, p. 31). It “redefines what learning is, what is possible, and what constitutes the quality of learning. At the very least, authorship presents the author’s bid for a new definition to the community of practice and the broader society” (p. 31). It seems that this approach to pedagogy is much more conducive to SMOD when students may not be motivated to engage with particular instructional activities, as is illustrated in the dialogue exchange described below.

In the dialogue that emerged between Matusov and two students, Zion and Maria, the students were ostensibly attempting to comply with a third grade language arts homework assignment for a technologically-oriented teacher. The students were carrying out their assignment in an after-school program at an urban Latin American Community Center where Matusov conducted part of a practicum for his teacher education students. For the assignment, which Matusov (p. 33) described as a “meaningless homework drill”, students were to copy new words as a way of improving their spelling ability. The homework requirement as imposed by the teacher constitutes stage one in the SMOD. Zion, in Matusov’s view, “was very reluctant” to engage with the assignment and as a result “did not pay much attention to his (mis)spellings” (p. 33). Zion’s reluctance and lack of attention to how the words were spelled represents the second, oppositional, stage 2 in the SMOD. At this point, Matusov intervened and instead of Zion and the teacher generating ideas for action, he suggested turning the drill into a “Scramble-like game of finding as many shorter words as possible within the targeted word that Zion had to copy three times” (p. 34). In effect, Matusov was responsible for stage 3, as he suggested a way out of the conflict between Zion and his teacher.

According to Matusov, Zion found the new activity entertaining as it focused his attention on patterns within each target word, which eventually resulted in his discovery of morphemes, but not without the intervention of a second student Maria.

SMOD between (M)atusov, (Z)ion and (Ma)ria triggered by the target word ‘exit’ (pp. 34-35)

1. Z: I see ‘it’ (exIT)
2. Z: And ‘ex’(EXit)
3. M: What does ‘ex’ mean?
4. Z: Ex, like an ex-boyfriend. My mom has an ex-boyfriend. I hate him.
5. M: Why?
6. Z: Because he constantly fought my mom.

At this point, Matusov and Zion engage in a brief conversation about the relationship between Zion and his mother's ex-boyfriend. During the conversation Zion makes a comment about his relationship with his cousin. He suddenly interrupts himself and blurts out the type of word he believes 'exit' is. We pick up the dialogue at this point:

7. Z: I know how this word is called.
8. M: How? What word?
9. Z: This one, 'exit'. It is a compound. We studied it in school (exclaimed with excitement).
10. M: How come?
11. Z: Because it is made out of two words, 'ex' and 'it' ! It's a compound!
12. Ma: (working on homework on a computer next to Z and M) No, it's not.
13. Z: Yes, IT IS! (yelling)
14. M: Why do you say it is not (directed at Maria)?
15. Ma: Just because I feel it.
16. M: What makes you feel it that way?
17. Ma: I don't know, but it does not feel like it's right.
18. Z: Exit consists of two words, like 'ex-boyfriend—it's a compound.
19. M: (to Maria) Are you trying to say that 'ex' and 'it' don't have anything to do with exit?
20. Ma: Smiles and nods
21. M: So, are you trying to say that a compound should consist of not just any words but words that contribute to its meaning?
22. Ma: Smiles and nods again.
23. M: Such parts of the word that constitute meaning are called morphemes. Ex-boyfriend consists of three word-morphemes: 'boy', 'friend', and 'ex'—all of which might be not whole words but meaningful parts of the word.
24. M: (Maria copying the target word 'beautiful'). I see two morphemes in the word: 'beauti' and 'ful'—something being 'full of beauty'.
25. Z: (points to 'apples' and explains to M and Ma that he saw two morphemes: Apple and 's' that indicated that there were many apples, not just one.

I suggest that stages 4 and 5 of the SMOD are reflected in the dialogue turns 19 to 25. Zion's analysis of 'exit' is not accurate and rather than overtly declare that Zion is wrong, Matusov instead asks him to explain his analysis, whereupon Zion justifies his claim that 'ex' is a legitimate morpheme on the basis of his mother's ex-boyfriend. The critical issue here is that Zion's is excited and enthusiastic about the Scramble-game—a clear emotional and intellectual shift from his disinterest and lack of attention to the goal of the homework assignment imposed by the teacher. Had Matusov immediately corrected Zion's analysis, he could well have responded negatively and withdrawn from the game. Given how Vygotsky describes *perezhivanie* as the dialectical unity of emotion and intellect it seems reasonable to conclude that Matusov's Scramble-game suggestion resulted not only in a change in Zion's emotional orientation but also his intellectual commitment to the challenge presented by the game. As Ollman (2015, p. 8) explains, in the logic of dialects, the correct response to which came first chicken or egg is "the other." This is because what at first seems to be a typical dualistic question about separate entities, from the internal logic of dialects "turns out to be a question about two moments in the development of the same one" (p. 8). In Zion's case, the same logic implies that the shift from drill to Scramble-game and Zion's subsequent enthusiasm for, and intellectual focus on, the new activity occurred simultaneously rather than as two separate processes whereby one preceded and triggered the other. In this new, SSD we observe the opening of an opportunity for Zion to develop the ability to carry out

morphemic analysis of words as well as a positive emotional orientation to learning the new words included in his homework assignment.

Even though Matusov does not directly challenge Zion's analysis of 'exit', it does not go unchallenged. However, it is another student, Maria, who raises the challenge. To be sure, as he responds to Maria's contention that 'ex-' is not a suffix in 'exit' Matusov, especially in turns 19 and 21, is indirectly critiquing Zion, but in a non-threatening way. To issue a direct criticism of Zion's analysis, might well have dampened the excitement he manifests in turns 09 and 11, as he asserts that 'exit' is a compound along with his enthusiastic response to Maria's disagreement expressed in turn 13. In this case, we observe the drama that development entails in the conflict that arises between Zion and Maria. Whether or not Zion abandons his claim that 'exit' is a compound we cannot be certain, but it does seem clear that he learned from the exchange between Matusov and Maria in turns 19 to 23 and from Matusov's analysis of the word 'beautiful' that Maria is working on in turn 24. Evidence for Zion's development is attested in his analysis of 'apples' as comprised of two morphemes in turn 25, although it does not qualify as a compound.

The preceding example demonstrates the effectiveness of SMOD in an educational SSD in which the dialogue that occurred between instructor and students was more complex than in the example of the interaction between parent and child regarding bedtime. The complexity entailed the fact that student motivation was not segregated from an instructional task. In other words, the task itself, recast by Matusov as a Scramble-game, generated a positive emotional and intellectual (*perezhivanie*) response from Zion, which then stimulated him to explore word patterns that not only enhanced his ability to spell words correctly, but resulted in a new ability to uncover the morphemic structure of words (Matusov, p. 34).

Matusov's argument is that unless educators are willing to find ways of genuinely involving learners in the process they want them to carry out, their instructional efforts will be futile (p. 36). This means creating "rich and complex learning environment[s]" through SMODs that are emotionally and intellectually stimulating instead of trying to coerce compliance with the curricular goals (p. 36). Interestingly, this view of education seems to be at odds with Patyayeva's technological orientation to the educational enterprise, which might explain why she does not perceive room for SMOD in classroom settings:

*The point is, that even a good teacher in the modern class-lesson system has to make the children do what the program prescribes: the teacher can discipline his pupils (or students) or fascinate them – but in most cases, there is no room for discussing what to do and what not to do. The teacher simply cannot afford motivational dialogues with his or her students, or else they would not master the school program. Of course, dialogues are possible in school, but mainly of other types: pedagogical, truth-oriented, sometimes even ideological ones. And motivational dialogues can usually take place only within very narrow bounds, for the most part, while discussing what to do after finishing school. As for other situations, in the majority of them, the children are obliged to fulfill the tasks and to answer the teacher's questions, but not to argue with the teacher or to cast doubt on his or her words. (Patyayeva, 2012, p. 205)*

If SMOD and other dialogues that occur in the educational setting are segregated as suggested by Patyayeva then indeed there may be scant opportunity to engage students in this fundamental mode of interaction. However, based on Matusov's authorial learning project, it seems possible that SMOD can be integrated with other dialogic modes, including pedagogical and truth-oriented interactions to become an effective means of simultaneously motivating and drawing students into the learning process where they can "define their own voices, address and respond to others... develop new desires and interests, take responsibility for their actions, opinions, views, and values" (Matusov, 2011, p. 36).

## 5.2 SMOD in a second language classroom: failure to motivate

In this and the following section I will consider evidence of both two types of motivational dialogue

as they unfold in a second language classroom setting. The dialogues when juxtaposed to each other manifest both the failure and success of the same individual. At first glance this may seem to be a contradiction. How can someone fail and succeed at the same time? As the story unfolds, however, I believe the evidence will indeed point to this conclusion.

The story was originally presented in a publication by Lantolf and Genung (2002), which documents the case of an individual, PG, who considered herself to be a successful language learner, and who enrolled in an intensive beginning Chinese language class. PG had attained various degrees of proficiency in several L2s during her adult life; yet, she found herself in a social situation that called her learning prowess into question. The analysis reported in Lantolf and Genung (2002) was carried out from the macro-perspective of activity theory; in the current analysis I use the micro-level lens offered by motivational dialogue.

### *5.2.1 The student*

PG was a doctoral candidate enrolled in a graduate linguistics program at a major North American research university. The focus of her work was on SLA, and she eventually completed a dissertation on the classroom acquisition of German word order by L1 English speakers. PG was also a colonel in the U.S. military, who had spent a considerable amount of time stationed abroad, including as head of an intelligence unit in Germany. She considered herself a good language learner. In addition to being a proficient speaker of German, she had varying levels of proficiency in French and Russian, and had also studied Latin. The military had agreed to fund her doctoral studies provided that she obtained the degree within a three-year period, which, despite the obstacle presented by the Chinese course, she managed to achieve. As a requirement for the degree students were expected to show proficiency in a non-European language either through an exam or through completion of six-credits of study. PG opted to fulfill the requirement through an eight-credit intensive summer Chinese course.

PG indicated that even though she had an interest in learning Chinese, had it not been for the degree requirement, she most likely would have foregone study of the language at that particular point in her life. Nevertheless, as the course began she was highly motivated to learn the language and her 'ideal L2 self' (Csizer & Dörnyei, 2005) looked forward to a successful learning outcome (Lantolf & Genung, 2002, p. 183). Based on courses she had taken in applied linguistics and on the general pedagogical orientation of language programs at the university, as well as on her personal observations of language courses, she anticipated that the Chinese course would implement a communicative-based instructional approach.

PG kept a daily log of her learning experience, anticipating that she might be able to use it as the basis of a research paper in a future graduate course. While Ushioda (2009, p. 222), with some merit, points to the drawback of diaries, narratives and retrospective accounts of classroom interactions in favor of analysis of real-time discourse, I nevertheless believe that PG's daily log captures to a sufficient extent the dramatic conflict she experienced in the course along with her failed attempts to ameliorate the situation through SMOD. My hope is that future research will document in real time the kind of dialogic exchanges that are only partially reflected in PG's log entries.

### *5.2.2 The Chinese course*

The course was an intensive nine-week summer program in which classes met for seven hours per day, five days a week. Students were also required to either attend a one-hour per-day lab session following class or check out tapes for home practice. Additionally, for the first four weeks, students were required to attend the showing of Chinese films on Friday evenings. For the remaining five weeks Friday evening was dedicated to practice of Chinese calligraphy. The stated goal of the course was for students to develop "culturally appropriate conversation and accurate reading" ability (Lantolf & Genung 2002,

p. 181). A total of sixteen students were enrolled. They were organized into groups of eight, which met in separate rooms. Each week the students were reorganized into different groups. Seats in the rooms were arranged in a semicircle with the instructor always positioned in front—the power position as the dispenser of knowledge and manager of all behavior (Auerbach, 1995, p. 13).

Four instructors were assigned to the course, three were native speakers (NSs) of Chinese and one, the program director, was a fluent non-native speaker (NNS). The NSs carried out drill sessions along with reading and writing activities. The role of the director, who met with the students on a daily basis, was to explain grammar, vocabulary and the Chinese writing system in English. If the students had questions regarding the explanations, they had to ask them in Chinese. They were not permitted to ask questions of the drill instructors. As Lantolf and Genung (2002, p. 180) observe, “this rule effectively prohibited the students from asking any questions at all.” The programmatic policy was that students were expected to be accurate in all aspects of the language, even at the expense of interesting meaning. Evaluation consisted of daily quizzes and biweekly unit tests. The quizzes asked students to insert correct tonal diacritics in pinyin sentences and then rewrite the sentences using characters. The unit tests consisted of English to Chinese *pinyin* translations as well as translations of Chinese sentences and phrases written in characters into English. Oral performance was evaluated by a duo of NS instructors.

Students were also required to recite memorized dialogues either with the instructor or another student. All grammatical, lexical and pronunciation errors were corrected immediately. The NNS instructor introduced ten new characters each day presenting the etymology and root through which the character could be found in a dictionary. Each afternoon, students practiced transcribing *pinyin* into characters and they were required to write five or six sentences in characters in a daily journal. When the instructors corrected the entries they sometimes responded to content with a joke or expressing their agreement or disagreement but using colloquial language that the students rarely understood.

### 5.2.3 *The beginning of the story and SMOD*

PG's initial positive motivation for studying Chinese quickly evaporated once she realized that class activity was teacher-fronted, rigorously controlled, and lacked any semblance of communicative activities. In essence, the course was an extreme example of technical education. PG's identity as a good L2 learner was immediately challenged, as attested by an early log entry in which she writes that she was “almost instantly transformed” into an ineffective learner by the attitudes and pedagogical behavior of the instructors (Lantolf & Genung, 2002, p. 184).

PG indicated that she felt the emotional need to show her intellectual prowess as a good language learner but was prevented from doing so because of the rigid nature of the pedagogy. She took it upon herself to confront the program director about what she saw as a non-viable pedagogy. While her log does not record the full text of this encounter, I believe that what she records indicates an attempt to engage him in SMOD. We can reasonably assume that her decision to speak with the director was induced by the general requirements and pedagogical orientation of the course (stage 1), which did not meet with her expectations. PG's log reports that she opposed (stage 2) what she saw as a misguided imposition that impacted her motivation and her self-image as a good learner: “disappointment at discovering that the course was almost entirely audio-lingual ‘drill and kill’ methodology and asked why such an intensive course diverged from the general communicative approach supported by the majority of the department in question.”

Although PG does not provide clear evidence of stages 3 and 4, which entail a search for, and discussion of, compromise, we can assume, given what she records as the director's response, the decision was imposed by this individual (stage 5): “as he understood it, it had been shown that Chinese is so different from the languages already familiar to most learners, largely from Indo-European backgrounds, [that] communicative classroom methodologies were not effective” (Lantolf & Genung, 2002, p. 184). PG

apparently made a second attempt to oppose the decision (most likely stage 3) in asking why the director thought her “brain would function one way when learning an Indo-European language and quite another way when learning an Asian language” (pp. 184-185). She did not record a response to her challenge, but based on her later log entries, we can assume that it had no impact on the director.

PG had questioned the validity of an ‘authoritative’ discourse, which according to Bakhtin, “are not negotiable” or “modifiable” and therefore demand “unconditional alliances” from other voices (Pollack & Kolikant, 2011, p. 130). From a dialectical perspective, PG failed at her attempt to achieve a compromise or a merger of voices that were clearly in conflict. Matters were made worse by the fact that several heritage speakers as well as other students who had spent time in Chinese-speaking environments were also enrolled in the class. PG confronted the director about what she saw as an unfair advantage of these students over gross beginners like herself when it came to grading policy. According to PG’s log, the director informed her that grades were based on a “fudge factor” whereby students were graded according to their oral performance, homework and “their progress in relation to their starting point” (Lantolf & Genung, 2002, p. 185). This response served to only enhance PG’s negative attitude toward the class.

Another problematic factor that PG felt infantilized the students was that at the beginning and conclusion of each class session the students were required to rise and address their instructors in Chinese as follows (stage1): “Good morning Old Master”, “Old Master, thank you”. PG felt this behavior was juvenile and demeaning and reminiscent of what might have happened in an elementary school” (Lantolf & Genung, 2002, p. 185). PG again confronted the program director regarding the requirement (stage 2). In response he informed her that it was an attempt to prepare students for what to expect should they ever study in China. As a counter PG (stage 3) pointed out that “students in China were not allowed to drink coffee and eat breakfast in the classroom, and they did not routinely come late to class”, a common behavior among her classmates (p. 185). Upon checking with Chinese colleagues, I can confirm that PG was correct in her assumption about the setting in which the greeting and leaving-taking behavior occurs. Moreover, having personally sat in on a number of university-level language classes in China, I have never observed adult students engage in such greeting and leave-taking behavior.

All of PG’s attempts to resolve the conflict and restructure the environment that would be conducive to development, not only for herself, but for her classmates were rebuffed by the program director. This left her with two incommensurable options—drop the course and find another means of fulfilling the degree requirement, or shift her psychological orientation to comply with the demands of the course, knowing at the same time, that she would have to compromise her ideal L2 self. PG resolved her internal drama through SDMOD, as discussed in the following section.

### 5.3 From SMOD to SDMOD

Following almost daily overt hypercritical evaluations of student performance by the instructors, including one salient incident in which PG felt an instructor had impugned her personal integrity by wrongly accusing her of having failed to prepare for a drill session, PG came to the conclusion that the classroom had become a hostile learning environment in which the instructors unfairly exploited their power advantage to the detriment of the students. Her repeated attempts to negotiate what she thought would be a more favorable SSD through SMOD met with consistent failure. Each time she undertook a stage (2) challenge and attempted to move to stages (3) and (4) as a way of resolving the conflict she was rebuffed.

At this point, PG was confronted with an emotional and intellectual conundrum. She disliked the pedagogical approach, she was dissatisfied with the grading policy, and she was exceedingly unhappy about the lack of concern for the student’s physical and emotional well-being. She clearly found herself immersed in a deleterious circumstance, which had a marked negative impact on her *perezhivanie*. She had become so emotionally distressed and intellectually debilitated by the situation and her failure to modify it that she felt the need to find a way to cope with what had become an intolerable situation.

There are indications in PG's log that she engaged in SDMOD through which she weighed an inner conflict between two options for resolving the stressful and frustrating conflict she was confronting (stage 2a, see Table 2). One pole of the conflict was her desire to fulfill her ideal language self as a Chinese speaker, while the other pole was her need to pass the course in order to fulfill the language requirement for the doctoral degree. She had to find a way out of an intolerable circumstance (stage 3). The following log entry expresses her course of action: "I had to pass the course, and the only way to do this was to learn what was put before me" (p. 188). Thus, it seems that her final decision on how to proceed as called for in stages (4) and (5) was clear. PG felt compelled to fulfill her "obligation to the Army", and this meant earning the PhD within the three-year funding window (p. 188). The key component, as she executed her decision (stage 6), was her interpretation of what it meant for her to "learn what was put before me" (p. 188). It clearly did not mean to develop an ideal L2 self in Chinese; rather it meant that she had to do whatever it would take to pass the course and thus fulfill the degree requirement. Lompscher (1999: 14) describes the process PG now launched as arising from a low-level cognitive motive, which promotes empirical-thinking directed at learning "isolated facts, details, and surface relations" and superficial mental behavior with the goal of achieving a specific short-term result. This is further documented in the following paragraph, which describes an especially dramatic experience, which PG describes as a "sea change" and "absolute disaster" (Lantolf & Genung, 2002, p. 189).

One of the students, who was fairly proficient in Chinese, was positioned in front of the class and the other students were directed to ask this individual any questions they wished. When the class remained silent, or told the instructor in English what they would like to ask, the instructor asked a question and the student answered but no one seemed able to follow what was said. According to PG, at the break the students expressed their utter frustration at having to shift from a rigid drill and memorization format to a more open and free-wheeling session. One student expressed his exasperation as follows: "what the hell was that all about?" (p. 189). For PG, the attempt to interject some communicative activity into the course near its conclusion, "took me away from my comfortable routine of drill and threw me into the less certain waters of actually having to communicate in the language, which required my attention and high level of involvement" (p. 190). She reports resenting the shift now that she had reoriented herself to the pedagogical format that she had tried unsuccessfully to modify at the outset of the course.

One of the most revealing statements regarding PG's shift in psychological orientation included in her log was the fact that her private speech, which she had used successfully when trying to figure out how to say certain things, to practice pronunciation, or remember vocabulary, outside of class when she was studying German (see de Guerrero, 2018; Werani, 2018; Lantolf, 1997) became a defensive strategy through which she rehearsed what she would likely be called on to produce during class. In the end, PG passed the course with a B+ grade, successfully completed the PhD, but failed to learn Chinese. PG's failure to change the orientation of the course through SMOD stimulated her internal SDMOD through which she talked herself into abandoning her dual motive of realizing her ideal L2 self in Chinese while at the same time meeting the external motive imposed by the military. I argue that the decision was simultaneously a failure and a success at exercising her free will. Indeed, she tried mightily to achieve her dual motives but recognized that once she would not succeed in this regard, she could still make adjustments in her voluntary behavior that resulted in success of a different kind. In terms of her *perezhivanie*, PG had initially experienced an emotionally negative and intellectually vapid environment, which she was not able to change through SMOD into a viable SSD. Eventually, with the decision to surrender her initial motive of learning Chinese through the SDMOD process, PG achieved a modicum of emotional and intellectual stability that allowed her to succeed in meeting the requirements for the degree.

## 6 Conclusions

In the preceding discussion I have considered what I think has the potential to become an important



new analytical and pedagogical tool for language education—motivational dialogue as proposed by Patyayeva (2012). The model reveals the significant role that inter- and intraindividual dialogue plays in the motivation process. Bringing the model into contact with Vygotsky's concepts of social situation of development, *perezhivanie* and self-control enhances both its analytical and pedagogical power. As a first attempt to relate Patyayeva's model to language education, I was unfortunately unable to present real-time original data and instead had to try to make the case with data drawn from other studies with different research goals. Nevertheless, I believe the analyses laid out in the paper suggest that the model is a topic that is very much worth exploring and refining. Along these lines, it seems clear that in actual educational settings, as illustrated with the data provided by Matusov's (2011) study, the various stages proposed by Patyayeva are not so neatly segregated, as one stage may well be incorporated into another stage. Moreover, it is conceivable that a single dialogue might well integrate multiple functions (motivational, pedagogical, truth-seeking, etc.).

It is important to point out that models in any scientific domain are intended to inform and enhance our understanding of a particular phenomenon. They are "approximations of the objects and systems that they represent—they are not exact replicas" (Rogers, 2021). For example, meteorologists model hurricanes on computers in order to capture the essence of what hurricanes are, but they do not reflect exactly the features of every possible hurricane, such as barometric pressure, wind speed, direction of movement, and the like. Similarly, Patyayeva's model of motivational dialogue is intended to reflect the essence of this type of social interaction, but actual real-world dialogues are likely to vary a great deal, including the ways in which the phases emerge, combine, recombine and even merge with other types of dialogues. Consequently, the model should not be viewed as a recipe for teachers to follow moving from one phase to the next in a mechanical fashion. Rather it is a concept to be understood in terms of the impact that this type of dialogue can have on the learning process. If we put things in terms of the concept of *perezhivanie*, the implication is that focusing only on the intellectual component of education to the neglect of the emotional component risks a loss of student interest in, and commitment to, the learning process, as seemed to happen to both Zion, when doing his original homework assignment, and PG as she confronted an intransigent program director. On the other hand, an emotional commitment on a learner's part in the absence of an appropriate intellectual challenge, whereby things are made too easy or too difficult (in Vygotsky's terms, not within the ZPD), is developmentally useless. It is a complex topic that warrants more extensive and deeper study than I have been able to present in this initial attempt to extend the model to L2 education. My hope is that others will be interested (motivated!) to take up the topic so that we can accumulate a body of knowledge on if and how motivational dialogue occurs in language classrooms and then hopefully engage pre- and in-service teachers in ways to integrate this type of dialogue into their classroom practice.

An interesting, and related question, raised by Poehner (personal communication, 2/4/21), is whether or not all stages must be present for a dialogue to qualify as a motivational dialogue? For instance, if someone suggests that a particular activity should be carried out, and another person agrees that it is a good thing to do without opposition, does this interchange qualify as a motivational dialogue? I think this depends on the underlying reason for agreeing to follow the direction or suggestion of someone else. As in the case of technical education, for instance, students have been largely enculturated into accepting their teacher's requests and requirements, as was evidenced in Zion's acquiescence in unenthusiastically carrying out his homework assignment. In my view, it would be difficult to characterize this situation as constituting a motivational dialogue. On the other hand, when Matusov recast the assignment as a Scramble-game, Zion emotionally and intellectually embraced the activity, which triggered a multifunctional dialogue that incorporated elements of SMOD.

With regard to SDMOD, one question to ask is what level of awareness is involved in engaging in this type of self-talk? Must it be carried out with a high degree of awareness and perhaps even overt private speech, or can it be completely internal and perhaps even below the level of an individual's full

awareness? From a research perspective, an important question is whether or not it is legitimate to ask an individual to retrospectively recall or reconstruct a self-dialogue. Can someone recall with objective accuracy an internal dialogue that occurred at an earlier time? A similar question was raised by Vygotsky (1997) with regard to introspective, or what some call ‘think aloud’ evidence, because he felt that talking about what one was thinking while at the same time thinking, interfered with the process the researcher was interested in observing.

Hulburt and Heavey (2004) have proposed a method that might well overcome or at least dampen the level of subjectivity that can seep into introspective reports. Avoiding the details of the method for present purposes, it entails the use of a beeper that randomly sends a signal to research participants as they go about their daily lives, at which point they must immediately record what they were thinking when they detected the beep. In the researchers’ view the method “has the potential to catch aspects of awareness that may be fleeting” as it maximizes “the chances that the fullest possible account of the event is still available to awareness” (Hulburt & Heavey, 2004, p. 116-117). The beep method is at least worth trying as a means of capturing SDMOD.

As Matusov’s dialogic exchange with Zion and Maria, as well as the data from Lantolf and Genung (2002) show, it may not be feasible, nor even desirable, to segregate the emotional and the intellectual components of the motivational process, as is often done in current applied linguistics research. This makes a great deal of sense given Vygotsky’s description of *perezhivanie* as a dialectical unit of consciousness that organically integrates emotion and intellect. Another interesting question for future research is whether or not it is feasible for teachers to engage in motivational dialogues with groups rather than with individual students only? Given the importance of dialogue in Gal’perin’s (1992) pedagogical model, Systemic Theoretical Instruction, can SMOD be built into the verbalization phases of the model (i.e., communicated and dialogic thinking) ?

Finally, it seems important for future research to investigate the consequences of successful as well as unsuccessful SMODs and SDMODs. While Matusov’s data shows a positive developmental outcome of the instructor ~ student dialogue, the data from Lantolf and Genung illustrates the negative consequences of a failed SMOD but at the same time, it demonstrates the positive consequences of the same individual’s SDMOD. While PG was unable to learn Chinese in the environment in which she found herself, she was able to reorient herself through internal self-talk to successfully complete the course and in so doing satisfy the degree requirement. A related matter is whether or not what is initially a failed dialogue can be converted into a successful one. This would seem to be an important pedagogical topic given what happened as a consequence of PG’s failure to generate a favorable SSD through an SMOD.

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